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Framing Scrappage  
1. Introduction 
The paper analyses the framing of European car scrappage schemes, focusing 
upon Germany and the UK. We use scrappage to provide insight into broader problems 
with transport policy development, to demonstrate the utility of our mobility regimes 
framework and to indicate directions for future research. 
We concur with NGO (Non Governmental Organisation) Transport and 
Environment (2009) that scrappage schemes, particularly their German and British 
variants, are problematic. While they may contribute to a reduction in headline CO2 
emissions figures for new cars (IHS Global Insight 2010), scrappage schemes have 
been criticised as an expensive way of achieving relatively small emissions cuts 
(Monbiot 2009). Taking into account whole-life emissions and changes in consumer 
behaviour, scrappage may be counterproductive in CO2 terms (Kagawa et al 2011). 
Scrappage schemes further seem to counteract long-term policy goals around modal 
shift, as they incentivise the purchase of cars rather than the use of more 
environmentally friendly transport modes. 
Given this, how and why were such schemes put in place, when their value is so 
questionable (in environmental, social, and even economic terms)? Why were climate 
change discourses apparently immobilised? And how did the construction of scrappage 
bring into play national cultural, economic, and political specificities? 
In addressing these questions we outline the environmental impasse into which 
transport policy has fallen at national and European levels. We explain our analytical 
framework; our concept of mobility regimes and the policy frames approach we use 
within this. Next we analyse how changes in environmental discourses have affected 
transport, specifically the shift from a broader ‘transport and the environment’ discourse 
to a narrower focus on climate change. Then we discuss our case study, scrappage 
policy at European, UK, and German levels, with a focus both on national specificity and 
a broader European shift towards ‘recession talk’. Finally we conclude with some 
thoughts on how our approach could be developed. 
2. Context: transport’s environmental impasse 
Hall (2010: 9) identifies climate change as the critical over-arching issue for 
transport research agendas. Yet the story of transport and CO2 emissions is one of 
continuing policy failure. The slow rise in car energy efficiency is outweighed by rising 
car ownership and rising travel distances (Stead 2007). Growing energy demand in the 
transport sector means that ‘[b]y 2030, it is estimated that 33% of all energy consumed 
in Europe will be consumed by transport’ (Stead 2007:343). This trend is due to longer 
travel distances (for freight and passengers), more vehicles and increasing air travel.  
The policy problem is clear but changes are in the wrong direction. We believe 
that focusing on culturally specific discourses and political settings can contribute to 
understanding this impasse. ‘[A]pparently successful efforts in the transformation of 
policy rhetoric may fail to transform policy practices because either the rhetoric does not 
reach the routines of practice or the changes leave contradictory deeper cultural 
assumptions in place.’ (Healey 1999:28). Arguably this happened in UK transport policy 
as ‘new realism’ became ‘pragmatic multimodalism’ (Walton and Shaw 2003). At a 
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European level transport policy discourse demonstrates long-standing, acute and 
unresolved tensions between ideals of European free trade and Europe as a ‘global 
environmental leader’ (Hall 2010).  
Speaking at the British Sociological Association Presidential Event 2010, John 
Urry argued that more positive imaginaries and incentives for sustainable futures could 
help to address this deadlock (Urry 2010). We suggest in this article how a mobility 
regimes approach can support this project, through developing knowledge about the 
different political opportunities for change presented in different national policy contexts. 
What might be considered a ‘positive’ policy discourse or proposal in Britain might not 
have the same implications in Germany, and vice versa. Scrappage enables us to study 
relationships between discourses and policies in contrasting national contexts. 
3. Analytical approach: mobility regimes and policy frames 
We use the term ‘mobility regimes’ to characterise changing and differentiated 
structural and discursive factors that shape and constrain ways of moving people and 
things. Mobility regimes incorporate policy frames, socio-economic specificities, and 
historically conditioned discourses and practices. The concept implies a research 
agenda investigating the roles of historically specific economic, political and cultural 
processes within contemporary capitalist societies (Urry 2000, 2004). It encourages a 
comparative and socially rooted approach to analysing transport that is multi-levelled 
and rooted in the history of geographically differentiated transitions to mass motorisation. 
Our approach acknowledges the relative autonomy of transport while maintaining 
its connection to other areas of policy and practice. Mobility regimes are affected by 
environmental discourses and associated policy-making, which have now achieved 
some legitimacy within transport policy processes (Golbuff and Aldred 2011). Mobility 
regimes are embedded in, and operate through, everyday routines including work (do 
employers allow home working?) and schooling (does locality or ‘choice’ dominate 
school provision?). The approach allows a focus upon the changing and contextual 
nature of the ‘car system’ (Urry 2007; Dennis and Urry 2009). Mobility regimes shape 
political responses to problems caused by twentieth century transitions to mass 
motorisation and so produce both obstacles to change and entry points. 
  Because of its multi-levelled nature a mobility regimes approach can co-exist with 
a variety of methodological approaches. Here we use policy frames to analyse 
scrappage policies. Concepts of framing were initially used in the sociology of social 
movements and in political science to analyse how the definition of political and 
sociological issues affects agenda setting. For social movements to succeed exponents 
must reformulate their values and motivations, adapting them to the orientations of those 
they wish to organise (Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1994; Della Porta and Diana 1999). 
  
In political science, two distinct perspectives on framing draw on different bodies 
of social scientific literature and have each developed a distinct research focus (Daviter 
2007: 656). The first perspective builds upon Schattschneider’s (1960) understanding of 
politics where conflict and competition structure ‘the terms of reference and the 
development and processing of political ideas and political demands’ (Mair 1997: 949). 
This implies a focus upon political actors, their interests and interest constellations. The 
second perspective draws on the work of Schön and Rein (1994). Framing here  
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‘offers a useful metaphor for how actors give a coherent organisation to a 
complex reality by selecting for attention a few salient features. At the same time, 
they argue also that the nature of ‘objective’ reality might be found in the world’s 
tendency to resist our interpretations, leading to a discovery of the limitations of 
particular frames’ (Dudley 1999: 51). 
  
A policy frames approach has contributed to the analysis of climate change 
discourse, focusing on competing interest claims and the use of metaphors or symbols 
to personify climate change and potential victims (e.g. Slocum 2004a on polar bears, 
Fletcher 2009 on the redefinition of climate change as a ‘security’ issue). The 
(re)definition of climate change raises questions about the scale of political action. 
Climate change is seen as exemplifying a shift towards the global level, a transnational 
problem transcending state boundaries. Yet nationally specific approaches still 
contribute to the framing of policies at different levels (Jordan 2002; Hajer 1995; Knill 
and Lenschow 1998; Lowe and Ward 1998; Brand 2007). 
A politics of scale and levels does not mean that the national has become 
obsolete but encourages us to focus on the redefinition of scales of political action. 
Bulkeley argues (2005: 890) that as scales of engagement shift, objects of governance 
are themselves transformed. A shift from European to national level policy-making, in 
line with the principle of subsidiarity, affects the construction of policy objects and 
discourses. In this case the re-nationalisation of automobile policy-making has opened 
the way to lobbying that seeks to foreground the ‘national car industry’ as imagined 
community – and as victim rather than villain. The use of different scales to shape policy 
discourse produces social and environmental ‘realities’ that in turn shape political values 
and spatial politics (Bunce and Desfor 2007). 
Environmental issues are framed in different ways, using concepts such as 
‘environmental justice’. Such concepts are not fixed but form, in Aygeman and Evans’ 
phrase ‘vocabularies of political opportunity’ (quoted in Walker, 2009: 370). Different 
vocabularies have different political implications, as many people particularly in lower 
income groups find it hard to relate to ‘the environment’ (Burningham and Thrush 2004), 
and climate change perceived as a global rather than a local issue may compound this 
problem. Yet while climate change is usually narrated as ‘global’ it can be ‘scaled’ at 
different levels in opposition to this dominant discourse through city-level campaigns and 
programmes (Bulkeley 2005, Mulugetta et al 2010).  
Scrappage policy-making similarly mobilises and marginalises competing 
vocabularies of political opportunity, both ‘environmental’ and ‘economic’. Scrappage 
may not even be seen as a ‘transport policy’; being constructed within the frame of 
business and enterprise policy, or environmental policy more widely, as we discuss 
below. However this is characteristic of transport policy, which incorporates and is 
incorporated within many other policy domains such as health (Aldred 2010). 
Focusing on scrappage as a transport policy here helps us to understand how 
issues relating to climate change and economic concerns are played off against each 
other in different policy contexts. Below we examine the changing policy consensus 
leading to the rapid spread of scrappage policies across European countries, focusing 
upon differences between Germany and the UK. We attribute these differences to 
distinct mobility regimes shaping the policy frames used to understand the interrelation 
between ‘transport’ and ‘climate change’. We aim to give an insight into the 
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distinctiveness of historically specific national mobility regimes, encouraging further 
research in the area. 
4. From environmental discourse to climate change discourse 
European transport policy discourse has increasingly been shaped by language 
and concepts used in climate change discourse (Hall 2010, Walton and Shaw 2003). 
The European car industry has been targeted by such challenges and has made 
concessions, accepting previously opposed mandatory CO2 emissions regulation in 
2008. The conceptualisation of climate change as a super-issue superseding other 
environmental issues framed the definition of policy issues and the scope of appropriate 
responses, in culturally specific ways. This has affected transport policy-making at 
European and national levels, with somewhat different effects in Germany and in the UK.  
In the case of cars and CO2 legislation, the perceived urgency of the climate 
threat ultimately trumped the automobile industry’s long opposition to mandatory 
regulations. Despite limitations, the legislation both used climate change discourse to 
frame transport policy-making and represented a challenge to core beliefs traditionally 
expressed in European transport policy documents (Giorgi and Schmidt 2002). The 
policy debate was constructed within an ‘ecological modernisation’ perspective (Hajer 
1995) stressing commonalities between economic and environmental interests. This 
allowed the legislation to appear as serving otherwise potentially opposing interests in 
the wider context of apparently healthy and growing economies. With CO2 the main 
target, issues less obviously amenable to technological solutions (such as road danger, 
local congestion and local air pollution) were sidelined.  
The proposed emissions legislation was portrayed as incentivising technological 
improvements to support environment and economy, tweaking a fundamentally healthy 
European automobile market and helping industry to plan more effectively for a lower-
carbon future. Importantly, attempts to limit speeds and advertising were removed from 
draft legislation, demonstrating the effective lobbying capability of the automobile 
industry at European as well as at national levels. Potential solutions became based 
around reducing engine emissions while keeping other factors constant, allowing the ‘car 
system’ to continue expanding on a structural level, while slowly decarbonising in terms 
of individual new cars. Moreover, the assumption that emissions regulation should 
support the automobile industry left ‘environmental transport policy’ vulnerable to a shift 
in policy frame if economic conditions changed. 
At national levels, the impact of climate change discourse has been substantial 
but differentiated. This is demonstrated by a comparison of policy debates in the UK and 
Germany. Other environmental discourses have continued to have a higher priority in 
German political discourse, while in the UK there has been a more dramatic shift at least 
at an official level. There is a history in the UK as defining transport as an environmental 
problem, in terms of local pollution, local congestion, and quality of life. Prior to the 
institutionalisation of climate change discourse, in the 2001 UK environmental attitudes 
and behaviour survey (DEFRA 2001) most respondents spontaneously mentioned 
‘traffic’ as the key environmental issue for the future. 
The terms of the UK debate have shifted dramatically since then as ‘cars and 
CO2’ has become increasingly prioritised. This was demonstrated through the setting up 
and resourcing of bodies such as the Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership (LCVP) and the 
Office for Low Emission Vehicles (OLEV). This looks set to continue with the current 
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Conservative-Liberal Democrat government focusing even more strongly on 
technological solutions to environmental problems (Hammond 2010). While the less 
technologically focused Cycling England and Commission for Integrated Transport were 
axed in the new government’s quango1 review, LCVP (an ad hoc advisory group) and 
OLEV (a cross-Whitehall team) were left out of this review and continue to exist. 
In Germany, awareness of global warming is high: more than half of the 
population fear it will strongly affect themselves, their quality of life and their families 
(Weidner 2005: 56). However, it is seen as among a number of environmental problems: 
surveys rank climate change as the third most pressing environmental problem, behind 
protecting water, soil and air and conserving energy sources and raw materials (Kasemir 
et al. 2000).  According to Weidner the normative concept of ‘public interest’ plays a 
distinctive role in German politics and policy-making, ‘especially when justice and equity 
issues are involved’ (Weidner 2005: 75).  This concept is strongly related to a national 
public interest, contrasting with a global or cosmopolitan norm of justice. 
Although climate change discourse has increasingly influenced German political 
discourse, a politics of more localised transport pollution continues to mobilise citizens. 
Germany retains strong traditions of locally regulating car emissions (in particular, 
particulate matter) through city-level action. In response to the car scrappage scheme a 
number of German cities introduced local ‘bike scrappage’ programmes (Transport and 
Environment 2009a). By contrast in Britain a local politics of vehicle emissions has been 
relatively lacking until the recent London Low Emission Zone, and CO2 has become the 
key campaigning issue in the area of transport. 
As the ‘CO2 and cars’ discourse has become more prominent, especially at 
European and UK levels, this has generated both opportunities and problems. On one 
hand ‘CO2 and cars’ discourse has helped to give ‘the environment’ a higher priority due 
to the high profile of climate change as global threat. However, the danger is that climate 
change appears as an issue which (a) cannot be understood by people through 
everyday experiences and (b) appears amenable to technical fixes – in this case, lower 
carbon cars (Slocum 2004). 
5. The Year of Scrappage 
The compromise cars and CO2 regulations crawled into place at the end of 2008. 
2009 became the year of scrappage or ‘cash for clunkers’2; although as we explain 
below different socio-political contexts in Britain and Germany shaped the two countries’ 
‘year of scrappage’ differently. As Europe moved deeper into recession, people were 
buying smaller cars, stopping buying cars, or driving less. In the UK in 2008, motor traffic 
fell by 1%, unprecedented in recent decades (Webster 2009). Such a reduction is a 
policy aim in many European countries, including UK and Germany (e.g. Department for 
Transport, 2009). However, instead of hailing a success, the debate was abruptly 
opportunity to economic threat. As the focus shifted from 
 
1 Quango: Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisation, otherwise known as Non-
Departmental Public Bodies. 
2 The term refers to the introduction of the US version of scrappage (US Car Allowance Rebate 
Scheme) which only allowed the exchange if the new car is smaller than the car to be scrapped  
and uses less petrol (NY Times 2009). The US scheme involved detailed instructions on the 
scrappage process in an attempt to avoid reselling. 
‘European environmental policy’ to ‘national car industries’, the potential for negative 
economic events to generate positive behaviour change became inconvenient.  
This was a two-fold shift in policy frames: firstly, framing stagnating car sales and 
falling travel as a crisis and secondly, framing this crisis as one appropriate for action at 
the national level. This produced a discursive context for European countries to protect 
their 'own' industry. States hurriedly introduced national scrappage schemes, paying 
drivers to have old cars destroyed conditional on buying a new one. The details of these 
schemes were nationally decided, but exhibited similar characteristics: although some 
included limited environmental criteria, none gave drivers money to scrap an old car in 
exchange for a public transport season ticket, a bicycle or walking equipment. 
Figure 1 demonstrates how European scrappage schemes ‘revitalised’ the 
European car market, whose sales fell only by 1.6% in 2009, despite the recession 
(Motor Trade Index 2010). In Italy, France and Spain scrappage schemes boosted car 
sales as late as January 2010; according to the French Car Makers Association, French 
car sales rose by 14% in January 2010 (Global Times 2010). 
Figure 1: New passenger car registrations, Germany, UK,  EU15
0
200,000
400,000
600,000
800,000
1,000,000
1,200,000
1,400,000
1,600,000
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Month
Germany 2008 UK 2008 EU15 2008
Germany 2009 UK 2009 EU15 2009
 
Source: ACEA data3 
While national schemes are distinct, with Spain offering interest free loans and 
Austrian car dealers paying 50% of incentives, the only western European countries that 
had not introduced scrappage schemes of any couleur by late 2009 were the 
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3 http://www.acea.be/index.php/news/news_detail/new_vehicle_registrations_by_country/  
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Scandinavian countries, Belgium and Switzerland. Figure 2 shows the main features of 
the major European scrappage schemes.   
Figure 2: Key features of major European scrappage schemes 
Country Age of car to be 
scrapped 
Emissions criteria4 Incentive 
France >10 years <160 g/km €1-2000 
Italy >10 years <140 g/km (petrol) 
or <130 g/km 
(diesel) 
€1500 
Spain >10 years <140 g/km 0% loan (up to 
€10000) 
Germany > 9 years None €2500 
UK >9 years None £2000 (split 
between dealer 
and government) 
 
In September 2008 the German ‘Abwrackprämie’ was proposed by Mathias 
Wissmann, President of the VDA (Verband Der Automobilindustrie, automobile industry 
association) to address the consequences of the financial crises for the German car 
industry. It was initially promoted by leading SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands, social democrats) politicians including Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
shadow chancellor Frank-Walter Steinmeier against voices from the CDU (Christlich 
Demokratische Union, conservatives) government (Der Spiegel 2009a). Officially 
introduced as the ‘environmental bonus’ (Umweltprämie) it introduced in January 2009 
as part of the Government’s Konjunkturpaket II. The German government put aside 5 
Billion Euro to finance the costs of the scheme. Until the scheme ran out in September 
2009, 2500 Euro was paid to those qualifying for the bonus. 
Britain’s scheme was similar except the amount offered to purchasers was more 
generous and the cost split between the dealer and the government. But the story of its 
introduction is different. When the UK announced its scrappage scheme in April 2009, 
ten other European countries already had schemes in place5. The British scheme was 
introduced after a vocal campaign by newspapers and industry lobbyists. In March 2009, 
the Sun tabloid (Britain’s top selling newspaper) launched a high profile campaign to 
make the UK government ‘pay for your bangers’ (Lanning 2009). Normally Eurosceptic 
to the point of xenophobia, the Sun called on the UK government to emulate the 
G supported the call and on 22nd April the UK scrappage ermans. Other newspapers 
                                                        
4 Not including the EURO-IV-Norm 
5 Germany introduced its scrappage scheme in January 2009, with France having introduced its 
scheme in December 2008. Countries that followed throughout 2009 included Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, Austria, the Netherlands, UK, Romania, Egypt, Spain, Japan and the US. Russia 
introduced a similar scheme in 2010 (Russland Aktuell 2009). 
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scheme was announced. Below we argue that the different policy trajectories in the two 
countries reflects the relative power positions of the German and the British car 
industries, and highlights the embeddings of these schemes in nationally-specific 
discursive structures and policy. 
6. Framing scrappage in Germany and the UK 
Although the UK and Germany both introduced scrappage in apparently similar 
political contexts, the introduction of the schemes highlights historically specific societal 
discourses and political cultures reflected in the ‘framing’ of the topic. This section 
analyses how the strength of the car industry and environmental policy discourses 
interacted to produce different constructions of ‘scrappage’ in Germany and the UK. In 
Germany both are strong while in the UK both are relatively weak; this matters in the 
framing of scrappage policy and challenges to it. 
Although the full impact of the economic crisis is yet to be seen, the German car 
industry remains economically and politically powerful. This is despite leading social 
scientists repeatedly announcing its death (Deutschlandradio 2007) as in 2004 when  
Opel laid off a significant part of its workforce6. Like the French car industry, the German 
industry has maintained its competitive position in relation to Japanese companies 
Toyota and Honda7. Pries (2005:2) argues that this was due to the state playing ‘a 
significant, also steering role in the economy, specifically in the motor economy’. The 
‘old’ European model of ‘Sozialpartnerschaft’ (social partnership) dominating the 
regulation of various societal interests in Germany was decisive. 
The German car industry even increased its dominance in German society and 
politics because of its internationally competitive position, with new records in exports 
during the early 2000s and increasing employment in the sector (Nunnenkamp 2008; 
see also 1998). Its influential role inside and outside Germany is further strengthened by 
its organisational structures. The Verband deutscher Automobilindustrie (VDA) unites 
not only all car manufacturers but also most component suppliers.  
The British car industry in comparison has been consistently weakened since the 
1960s, finding it increasingly difficult to secure an internationally competitive position 
(Church 1994). This was aggravated by Thatcherite attempts to shift the British economy 
away from regionally based manufacturing both unions and the Labour Party were 
traditionally strong. During this period once dominant British-owned mass-market 
manufacturers collapsed or were bought up. The remaining UK-based car industry is 
now export-oriented, with around 200,000 workers directly accounting for 5.9% of UK 
manufacturing employment (NAIGT 2009). While production remains significant, 
employment levels continue to fall. UK car manufacturing has shed over 10,000 
employees on average every year for the last 10 years (NAIGT 2009). 
While postwar UK economic development – increasing favouring London-based 
and financial interests – has weakened the position of regions relying on manufacturing, 
the situation in Germany is different. The regionalisation of the German car industry 
strengthens the hand of German federal states (Laender) in key locations such as North 
Rhine Westphalia and B . Regional politicians there promote the regionally based 
 
6 The impact of the refusal of General Motors in late 2009 to sell Opel have yet to be seen. 
7 The full impact of Toyota's crisis of mass car recalls is not yet known. 
  10
s. Thi
                                                       
motor industry when it comes to securing locations and/or questions of employment. The 
different political situation in the two countries highlights the different construction of 
‘scales of engagement in policy’ (Bulkeley 2005). One example of the role of German 
regional politicians is former Hessian minister, Roland Koch’s efforts in negotiating a 
buyer of Opel in 2009 (Der Spiegel 2009). Partly due to the absence of federal states, 
partly due to the weakness of the UK car industry in linking interests with political 
regions, there is no UK equivalent.  
The culture of the manufacturers matters as well as their contrasting economic 
positions. In Germany, manufacturers tend to make middle market and high end 
vehicles, rather than the smaller vehicles made in France or Spain. While this is part of 
the regional organisation of European car production, it simultaneously maintains 
different national political cultures. For German manufacturers, promoting their product 
as ‘green’ is a marketing strategy aimed at more affluent customers. A message that 
scrappage is economically necessary would potentially damage their brands, which seek 
to position themselves as luxury or successful, not struggling.8 In the UK, where the car 
industry has long been seen as struggling, economic messaging may be more important 
and less threatening to the brands. 
Calling the scheme an environmental bonus (while it was publically discussed as 
a scrappage-bonus) reflects the self-representation of the German Government as 
Green, and the media representation of Angela Merkel as the ‘Klimakanzlerin’ (climate 
chancellor) (Frankfurter Rundschau 2009). It may also be an attempt to connect with the 
self-representation of Germans as ‘green drivers’ (see European Commission 2007). 
‘Eco-driving’ has been included in the German driving test since the end of the 1990s 
(see http://www.neues-fahren.de/neues-fahren/default.htm). As Meyer et al. 2002 show, 
the integration of environmental discourses plays an important role in German politics. 
Policy initiatives may be portrayed and even labelled environmentally friendly, even if 
challenging discourses are supported by leading environmental organisations. 
Major German environmental NGOs opposed the ‘environmental’ bonus as did 
the Bundestag parties Die Grünen and Die Linke.9 Criticisms related to the lack of 
environmental conditions for the new car purchased, which might have included limits on 
the car’s CO2 emissions or petrol consumption per kilometre (Der Spiegel 2009). Other 
criticisms questioned the effectiveness of the scheme in terms of supporting German car 
manufacturers, the effectiveness of the scheme in actually scrapping old cars (NY Times 
2009a) and the scheme’s long-term consequences. 
In the UK, by contrast, a strikingly similar scrappage scheme was never 
portrayed as ‘environmental’, demonstrating that environmental discourse is less 
important to the framing of transport policy-making. Scrappage was introduced relatively 
late and the UK government initially ‘only’ allocated £300 million to the scheme (BBC 
News 2009). While the UK’s motor industry body – the Society of Motor Manufacturers 
and Traders (SMMT) – had lobbied for the scheme, the European Commission co-
ordinated pressure from other European leaders (Independent 2009). In the UK press, 
discussion of a scrappage scheme only took off after other countries had already 
introduced such scheme s we feel is related to the relatively weaker position of the 
 
8 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this point. 
9 The Greens and the Left Party. 
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UK motor industry. In this context it is worth noting that the SMMT does not organise 
only UK-based manufacturers but also manufacturers who sell into the UK. 
Following the introduction of the UK scheme, rising vehicle purchases were 
widely greeted as an economic ‘good news story’, with relatively little debate around 
potential environmental consequences. The shift away from car travel encouraged by 
falling incomes and rising oil prices had been portrayed in the UK media, by 
governments, and by company and union leaders as a crisis without mitigating features 
(e.g. Ruddick and Sibun 2009; Clark 2009), rather than – for example – as representing 
‘good’ transport choices by individuals in an unfavourable situation. Scrappage was 
largely discussed in terms of impact on the car industry, with the most prominent 
critiques based around nationalism or consumerism (e.g. the likelihood that new cars 
would be produced abroad, or the failure of dealers to pass on savings to the consumer), 
rather than around the environmental impact of the scheme.  
In the UK, the prioritisation of the economic over the environmental and failure to 
consider how ecological modernisation (Mol 2001) might connect the two demonstrates 
the relative failure to embed an environmental transport discourse in policy-making. 
Although the UK government of the time also attempted to portray itself as ‘green’, this 
discourse was absent in the construction of its scrappage scheme. Conversely in 
Germany, a stronger car industry secured an earlier and more generous scrappage 
scheme, but one that for nationally specific reasons was framed in environmental terms. 
The countries demonstrate national differences in terms of the strength of environmental 
discourses, and the strength of domestic motor industries. These mobility regime 
differences have led to ‘scrappage’ being framed and implemented differently. 
7. Conclusion 
The story of how the hobbled cars and CO2 legislation gave way to the Year of 
Scrappage demonstrates the limited impact climate change discourse has had upon 
policy frames. While ‘business as usual’ had been agreed by policy-makers to be 
unsustainable, when it appeared under threat many rushed to call for its return. Invoking 
‘economic necessity’ put environmental advocates onto the defensive and blocked the 
alternative possibility of encouraging a shift away from the car while mitigating negative 
social consequences of this shift. In other policy areas too, such as housing (where UK 
environmental standards have recently been weakened) apparent enthusiasm for ‘the 
environment’ has waned as an ‘age of austerity’ casts environmental protection as 
unaffordable luxury. 
In Germany and the UK, recession talk was used to reframe transport policy 
around nationally organised support for car industries. However, the policy frames 
differed, shaped by differently constituted mobility regimes. In the UK, scrappage was 
initially delayed by the then Labour government’s reluctance to be seen to subsidise ‘old’ 
manufacturing industry. In Germany the ‘national interest’ – constructed there as 
distinctively important for policy – was swiftly framed as securing the competitive position 
of its car industry. This overruled the international or global interest in sustainable futures 
yet was framed to construct scrappage as supporting such futures; as the environmental 
bonus. This is in line with a strong consensus within German society that developed 
countries should take a greater burden and carry greater responsibility for tackling 
climate change than less developed countries (Weidner 2005) – hence the need to 
present and perceive even apparently unpromising policies as exactly doing this. 
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In the UK, the presentation of scrappage as purely economic demonstrated a 
profound failure to embed environmental criteria in transport policy-making The German 
picture is subtly different, indicated by the description of the scrappage scheme there as 
an environmental bonus. There the recession was still seen as offering a potential 
opportunity for the car industry to benefit from investing in ‘clean technology’. This could 
be linked to the institutional ‘greening” of German political discourse, and the history of a 
‘European social model’ stressing ‘win-win’ solutions (i.e. in this case, a sustainable 
capitalism), weaker in the UK. In Germany, policy-makers’ perceived continuing need to 
use ‘environmental’ discourse offers a potential opening for change, albeit shaped by the 
limits of ‘ecological modernisation’ discourse. 
Despite the limitations and tensions inherent in dominant environmental 
discourses, the environmental framing of transport policies is potentially important in 
creating opportunities for more radical challenges. Within Germany, the politics of local 
pollution has helped to keep the door open for environmental policy frames. Within the 
UK, movements attempting to relocalise environmental issues may play a similar role. 
Yet in both countries debates around cars and CO2  are primarily conducted on behalf of 
‘the economy’ or ‘the environment’ with issues around quality of life sidelined by a 
technological approach to climate change. Given the strong public interest in quality of 
life issues, strengthening this social dimension could contribute to maintaining an 
environmental framing in transport policy discourse. 
At the beginning of this paper we suggested that scrappage provides an insight 
into broader problems related to transport policy development and how different national 
policy contexts continue to shape how this tension is framed and used to make policy. 
There are other substantial transport policy differences within a European context (for 
example, the positioning of cycling or the framing of public transport) that could be 
analysed using a similar approach. The European level entails its own cultural, political 
and economic interest constellations and particularities and further research would help 
to identify these. Combined with a clearer understanding of national mobility regimes this 
could help identify paths towards more sustainable transport futures. 
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